In: Politické vedy: časopis pre politológiu, najnovšie dejiny, medzinárodné vztʹahy, bezpec̆nostné s̆túdiá = Political sciences : journal for political sciences, modern history, international relations, security studies, Band 22, Heft 4, S. 259-265
The last election in the Slovak and Czech Republic was special. It not only took place before the official electoral period (pre-elections), but new political parties were "again" successful. The article focuses not only on both elections in the last two years in a comparative perspective, but it analyses the opportunity structure of success as well, including types of new political parties (according to Lucardie). The article seeks to answer the question: why are new political parties electorally successful, able to break into parliament and even become part of a coalition government? We assume that the emergence and success of new political parties in both countries relied on the ability to promote "old" ideas in a new fashion, colloquially referred to as "new suits" or "old" ideological flows in new breeze.
"Americanisation" in political campaign assumes on the one hand that all changes, techniques and campaign tools were directly taken from the United States. On the other hand, it also reflects general developments in political policy, media and society (modernization). The main objective of this article is to examine these trends by using the example of new democracy – the Slovak Republic? The paper therefore identifies the main characteristics of the process, but also to set an adequate methodological framework and try to explore it in the Slovak environment, specifically in the context of the presidential elections of 2009 and 2014.
This is an exploratory study of populist political movement Sme rodina – Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár, since November 2019 only Sme rodina). The paper first locates this movement into a lose concept/sui generis family of political parties (the niche party), arguing in contrast to some typologies that this is primarily protest populist party presenting some niche issues, and only secondarily, an entrepreneurial party. The paper also answers the question why this party is considered as being populist by many political and non-political actors and analysts. The paper also suggests that there is actually non-existent, but assumed direct correlation between the support for this party and the decline in the standard of living, as sometimes presented in public discourse. In contrast, it is suggested here that there may be stronger links between relative poverty, feeling of being abandoned by political elites/parties, and low educational levels. Moreover, there played an important role previous knowledge (celebrity status) of the party leader who was often presented and discussed in tabloid media. For this reason, many young females voted for this party. The party also managed to raise a widely perceived problematic issue that was seen as not tackled sufficiently or at all by the previous governments and other competing political parties (the niche or salient issue).
This is an exploratory study of populist political movement Sme rodina – Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár, since November 2019 only Sme rodina). The paper first locates this movement into a lose concept/sui generis family of political parties (the niche party), arguing in contrast to some typologies that this is primarily protest populist party presenting some niche issues, and only secondarily, an entrepreneurial party. The paper also answers the question why this party is considered as being populist by many political and non-political actors and analysts. The paper also suggests that there is actually non-existent, but assumed direct correlation between the support for this party and the decline in the standard of living, as sometimes presented in public discourse. In contrast, it is suggested here that there may be stronger links between relative poverty, feeling of being abandoned by political elites/parties, and low educational levels. Moreover, there played an important role previous knowledge (celebrity status) of the party leader who was often presented and discussed in tabloid media. For this reason, many young females voted for this party. The party also managed to raise a widely perceived problematic issue that was seen as not tackled sufficiently or at all by the previous governments and other competing political parties (the niche or salient issue). ; Artykuł opisuje badanie wyjaśniające dotyczące populistycznego ruchu politycznego Sme rodina – Borisa Kollára (Jesteśmy Rodziną – Boris Kollár, od listopada 2019 wyłącznie Sme rodina). W pierwszej kolejności artykuł umieszcza ruch w generalnej koncepcji sui generis rodziny partii politycznych (partia niszowa), w przeciwieństwie do niektórych klasyfikacji określających ruch jako przede wszystkim populistyczną partię protestu, koncentrującą się na niektórych kwestiach niszowych, a dopiero w drugiej kolejności jako partię przedsiębiorców. Artykuł odpowiada na pytanie dlaczego partia uważana jest za populistyczną przez licznych politycznych i niepolitycznych aktorów i analityków. Artykuł również sugeruje, że w rzeczywistości nie ma zakładanego bezpośredniego związku pomiędzy poparciem dla tej partii a pogorszeniem się poziomu życia, jak czasem jest to przedstawiane w dyskursie publicznym. Wręcz przeciwnie, artykuł sugeruje, że mogą występować silniejsze powiązania pomiędzy względnym ubóstwem, poczuciem opuszczenia przez polityczne elity/partie a niskim poziomem wykształcenia. Ponadto, istotną rolę odgrywa znajomość lidera partii (o statusie celebryty), który często pojawiał się i był opisywany przez media bulwarowe (tabloidy). Z tego powodu, wiele młodych kobiet oddało głos na tę partię. Partia zaczęła również podnosić kwestie postrzegane jako problematyczne, którymi poprzednie rządy i inne partie polityczne nie zajmowały się w ogóle lub w niewystarczającym stopniu (kwestie niszowe lub szczególnie istotne).
This is an exploratory study of populist political movement Sme rodina – Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár, since November 2019 only Sme rodina). The paper first locates this movement into a lose concept/sui generis family of political parties (the niche party), arguing in contrast to some typologies that this is primarily protest populist party presenting some niche issues, and only secondarily, an entrepreneurial party. The paper also answers the question why this party is considered as being populist by many political and non-political actors and analysts. The paper also suggests that there is actually non-existent, but assumed direct correlation between the support for this party and the decline in the standard of living, as sometimes presented in public discourse. In contrast, it is suggested here that there may be stronger links between relative poverty, feeling of being abandoned by political elites/parties, and low educational levels. Moreover, there played an important role previous knowledge (celebrity status) of the party leader who was often presented and discussed in tabloid media. For this reason, many young females voted for this party. The party also managed to raise a widely perceived problematic issue that was seen as not tackled sufficiently or at all by the previous governments and other competing political parties (the niche or salient issue). ; Artykuł opisuje badanie wyjaśniające dotyczące populistycznego ruchu politycznego Sme rodina – Borisa Kollára (Jesteśmy Rodziną – Boris Kollár, od listopada 2019 wyłącznie Sme rodina). W pierwszej kolejności artykuł umieszcza ruch w generalnej koncepcji sui generis rodziny partii politycznych (partia niszowa), w przeciwieństwie do niektórych klasyfikacji określających ruch jako przede wszystkim populistyczną partię protestu, koncentrującą się na niektórych kwestiach niszowych, a dopiero w drugiej kolejności jako partię przedsiębiorców. Artykuł odpowiada na pytanie dlaczego partia uważana jest za populistyczną przez licznych politycznych i niepolitycznych aktorów i analityków. Artykuł również sugeruje, że w rzeczywistości nie ma zakładanego bezpośredniego związku pomiędzy poparciem dla tej partii a pogorszeniem się poziomu życia, jak czasem jest to przedstawiane w dyskursie publicznym. Wręcz przeciwnie, artykuł sugeruje, że mogą występować silniejsze powiązania pomiędzy względnym ubóstwem, poczuciem opuszczenia przez polityczne elity/partie a niskim poziomem wykształcenia. Ponadto, istotną rolę odgrywa znajomość lidera partii (o statusie celebryty), który często pojawiał się i był opisywany przez media bulwarowe (tabloidy). Z tego powodu, wiele młodych kobiet oddało głos na tę partię. Partia zaczęła również podnosić kwestie postrzegane jako problematyczne, którymi poprzednie rządy i inne partie polityczne nie zajmowały się w ogóle lub w niewystarczającym stopniu (kwestie niszowe lub szczególnie istotne).
Abstract The migration crisis has not only influenced the societies of Europe, their governments, and decisions taken by them but also affected the work of media. As soon as the migration crisis began to escalate in Europe, the old continent has continuously tried to cope with the influx of refugees from the war-threatened Middle East; not only individual statements of politicians and influential individuals but also communication flows themselves, which have created content and expanded context within networks, have become the center of interest. We can assume that in the previous months (especially in the case of the Slovak Republic), political and media discourses influenced societal and individual opinions and attitudes toward the migration crisis. The main aim of this article is to compare the various contents in the Slovak printed media in the context of the migration crisis. The dominant focus will be on analyzing media messages in the analyzed period in the context of creating political (media-based and electoral) discourse on the refugee crisis. We assume that over time, the main political discourse changed, and that the rhetoric of the main political actors also changed over time. The reason for this shift was the national election in March 2016.
In: Slovak journal of political sciences: the journal of University of Saint Cyril and Metodius in Trnava = Slovenská politologická revue, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 34-48
The recent parliamentary elections which took place in The Slovak Republic in March 2016 opened for many national and international commentators the bottled of demons from the past history of Slovakia. For the first time a Far right extremist political party entered into parliament and held seats there. They gained more than some standard political parties and also were not dubbed as the "black" horse of this election. As they were not measured by public opinion. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the fundamental purpose of voters that had elected this political party and on the other hand the main reason that has opened the parliamentary door to such a political entity that was not visible in the previous electoral periods or played any important role in the independence of Slovak republic. Our main assumption will be that which is taken from the media analysis before the parliamentary election and public opinion research. Our main variable from the external environment will be the migration refugee crisis and the rhetoric of political parties acting at national level. We can assume that this was one of the main reason for the entry of this political party within others which were "hidden" or covered by this crisis and were not mediatized in the media.
This is an exploratory study of populist political movement Sme rodina – Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár, since November 2019 only Sme rodina). The paper first locates this movement into a lose concept/sui generis family of political parties (the niche party), arguing in contrast to some typologies that this is primarily protest populist party presenting some niche issues, and only secondarily, an entrepreneurial party. The paper also answers the question why this party is considered as being populist by many political and non-political actors and analysts. The paper also suggests that there is actually non-existent, but assumed direct correlation between the support for this party and the decline in the standard of living, as sometimes presented in public discourse. In contrast, it is suggested here that there may be stronger links between relative poverty, feeling of being abandoned by political elites/parties, and low educational levels. Moreover, there played an important role previous knowledge (celebrity status) of the party leader who was often presented and discussed in tabloid media. For this reason, many young females voted for this party. The party also managed to raise a widely perceived problematic issue that was seen as not tackled sufficiently or at all by the previous governments and other competing political parties (the niche or salient issue).
There was found just one preference for alternative or controversial sources that Babiš designated as permanently liked media sources on FB. Surprisingly, Babiš did not even "like" permanently any of those media that he purchased a few years earlier and put into the governance of a special foundation while acting like a politician. Babiš preferred quality economic business magazines and journals. He liked only one media source that could be considered alternative media – Internet TV XTV. However, not even this online TV can be seen as a traditional alternative/disinformation medium, but rather as a borderline case. Andrej Babiš on FB also liked pages of NGOs, cultural institutions, and some other rather unusual non-political activities.
There was found just one preference for alternative or controversial sources that Babiš designated as permanently liked media sources on FB. Surprisingly, Babiš did not even "like" permanently any of those media that he purchased a few years earlier and put into the governance of a special foundation while acting like a politician. Babiš preferred quality economic business magazines and journals. He liked only one media source that could be considered alternative media – Internet TV XTV. However, not even this online TV can be seen as a traditional alternative/disinformation medium, but rather as a borderline case. Andrej Babiš on FB also liked pages of NGOs, cultural institutions, and some other rather unusual non-political activities. ; Odkryto tylko jedną preferencję wobec alternatywnych lub kontrowersyjnych źródeł, które Babiš określił jako stale lubiane źródła medialne na FB. Co zaskakujące, Babiš nawet nie "polubił" na stałe żadnego z tych mediów, które zakupił kilka lat wcześniej i przekazał zarządzanie nimi specjalnej fundacji, samemu zachowując się przy tym jak polityk. Babiš preferował wysokiej jakości czasopisma ekonomiczne i biznesowe. Spodobało mu się tylko jedno źródło mediów, które można uznać za media alternatywne – Internet TV XTV. Jednak nawet ta internetowa stacja telewizyjna nie może być postrzegana jako tradycyjne medium alternatywne/dezinformacyjne, ale raczej jako przypadek graniczny. Andrej Babiš polubił też na FB strony organizacji pozarządowych, instytucji kultury i inne, dość nietypowe aktywności o niepolitycznym charakterze.
There was found just one preference for alternative or controversial sources that Babiš designated as permanently liked media sources on FB. Surprisingly, Babiš did not even "like" permanently any of those media that he purchased a few years earlier and put into the governance of a special foundation while acting like a politician. Babiš preferred quality economic business magazines and journals. He liked only one media source that could be considered alternative media – Internet TV XTV. However, not even this online TV can be seen as a traditional alternative/disinformation medium, but rather as a borderline case. Andrej Babiš on FB also liked pages of NGOs, cultural institutions, and some other rather unusual non-political activities. ; Odkryto tylko jedną preferencję wobec alternatywnych lub kontrowersyjnych źródeł, które Babiš określił jako stale lubiane źródła medialne na FB. Co zaskakujące, Babiš nawet nie "polubił" na stałe żadnego z tych mediów, które zakupił kilka lat wcześniej i przekazał zarządzanie nimi specjalnej fundacji, samemu zachowując się przy tym jak polityk. Babiš preferował wysokiej jakości czasopisma ekonomiczne i biznesowe. Spodobało mu się tylko jedno źródło mediów, które można uznać za media alternatywne – Internet TV XTV. Jednak nawet ta internetowa stacja telewizyjna nie może być postrzegana jako tradycyjne medium alternatywne/dezinformacyjne, ale raczej jako przypadek graniczny. Andrej Babiš polubił też na FB strony organizacji pozarządowych, instytucji kultury i inne, dość nietypowe aktywności o niepolitycznym charakterze.